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Cross-border Litigation Involving Canadian and U.S. Litigants
Bruno A. Ristau *
I. CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND
EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS
Overview of the Convention
The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extraju-dicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters1 ("Hague Service
Convention" or "Convention") was developed at the Tenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law ("Hague Confer-
ence"), which the United States joined in 1964. The purpose of this Con-
vention was to modernize and revise the Hague Conventions on Civil
Procedure of 1905 and 1954. Currently more than two dozen states are
parties to the Convention.
The Hague Service Convention establishes a multilateral regime
among the states which become parties, by ratification or accession, for
the service of legal documents abroad in "civil or commercial" matters.'
The Convention consists of thirty-one articles, divided into three chap-
ters. Chapter I defines the meaning of "Judicial Documents" and estab-
lishes the Convention machinery. Chapter II deals with private
documents, not related to litigation, which may nonetheless require for-
mal service. Chapter III contains general clauses. The Convention ad-
dresses five different areas:
(1) the methods by which service of judicial and other documents may
be made in another country;
(2) language requirements;
(3) proof of service;
(4) default judgments; and
(5) costs and fees related to service.
When a state becomes a party to the Convention it is required to
designate at least one "Central Authority." However, federal states may
designate more than one such authority. The Central Authority has the
responsibility for receiving requests for service from other states and for
* Partner, Ristau & Abbell, Washington, D.C.
1 Done at the Hague November 15, 1965; entered into force for the United States February 10,
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executing these requests.' "Requests" for service are to be made on a
form set forth in an annex to the Convention.' The request must be ac-
companied by the document to be serviced, and a "summary" of that
document 5 as prescribed in a second form set forth in the annex. Legali-
zation of the requests is not required.'
The Convention allows three possible methods of service:
(1) under a method prescribed by the internal law of the country of
service for domestic actions;
(2) pursuant to a particular method requested by the applicant; and
(3) by voluntary acceptance by the addressee.
The second and third methods may not be used if they are inconsistent
with the laws of the country where service is to be made.7
Requests for service under the Convention may be made in French
or English, as well as in the language of the country where the document
is to be served.' However, if the document is to be served under method
one or two described above, a translation of the document into the official
language of the country of service may be required.9
If a request for service is deficient, the Central Authority of the re-
ceiving state is required to notify the applicant promptly and to specify
its objections to the request. 10 The grounds upon which a state may re-
fuse to execute a request are extremely limited.1
Once service is completed, the Central Authority of the receiving
state is required to complete a "certificate" on a third form annexed to
the Convention. 2 This certificate establishes that either service has been
made, and the particulars thereof, or that service has not been made, and
the reasons why it has not been made.
1 3
With respect to default, the Convention provides that if service has
been effected but the defendant has not appeared, a default judgment
may not be entered until certain facts concerning service have been estab-
lished. 4 (A country may vary by declaration which facts are to be con-
sidered under certain conditions." Many countries have made such
declarations.) Additionally, the Convention permits relief from default
3 Article 2. The Central Authority for the United States, for example, is the U.S. Department
of Justice.
4 Article 3.
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judgments under prescribed conditions.16 A number of states have made
declarations limiting the time within which applications for relief from
default judgments may be filed.
The Convention places limits on the costs payable in connection
with service of documents under its provisions.17 Several countries' dec-
larations contain additional provisions relating to such costs.
In addition to the three conventional methods of service, the Con-
vention permits service (without compulsion) through the diplomatic or
consular agents of a contracting State.1 8 States may, by declaration, limit
the right to make such service to only the nationals of the requesting
State. Most contracting states have made such a declaration. The Con-
vention also permits "sending" (note the language "send" rather than
"serve") documents by mail to recipients abroad, and the direct service
of documents to judicial authorities in the State of destination (bypassing
the Central Authority), unless states declare their opposition to such pro-
cedures. Several states have declared that they are opposed to such
procedures.
The declarations of the country to which a request for service will be
made must be studied carefully before making the request, because the
declarations vary the effect of the Convention in a given State. In the
United States, procedures for service abroad are available in federal as
well as state courts. To the extent that a state's method for service ofjudicial documents abroad is inconsistent with the Convention, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that the
inconsistent state procedures not be employed.
Issues under the Hague Service Convention
Since the Convention's entry into force, a number of issues have
arisen concerning its construction and operation. One noteworthy issue
relates to the scope of the Convention. The Convention does not define
the term "civil or commercial matters," which determines its scope. Be-
cause the term is not defined, it is interpreted differently by each state.
There is agreement that criminal matters fall outside the Convention's
scope. However, some countries also exclude administrative, fiscal, and
family law matters when these issues are not characterized as "civil or
commercial" under their internal laws.
Another issue relates to whether the Convention's procedures are
exclusive (and therefore must be followed when a party to be served is
located abroad), or non-exclusive (allowing resort to other methods of
service; for example, those permitted under Rule 4(i) of the Federal
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Schlunk,20 the Supreme Court held that the Hague Service Convention is
inapplicable where process can be validly served on a foreign corporation
by serving its U.S. subsidiary which, under state law, is treated as the
foreign parent's involuntary agent for service of process. Inasmuch as
the result in Schlunk turned on Illinois law, its application in other states
will depend on whether their internal law requires transmittal of docu-
ments abroad for purposes of service where a foreign party is involved,
thereby triggering the Convention, or alternatively, permits substituted
service of the type used in Schlunk.
Another vexing issue under the Convention is whether, absent a
state declaration of opposition, service by registered mail is permitted by
Article 10, paragraph (a), which, as noted, allows the "sending" of docu-
ments through postal channels. Courts have split on this issue in the
United States, with some courts construing "send" to mean "serve," and
others distinguishing the two terms.
Parties to the Hague Service Convention as a January 1, 1991






Czechoslovakia Japan United Kingdom
Denmark Luxembourg United States
Egypt Malawi
Finland Netherlands
II. CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL
OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
Overview of the Convention
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters21 ("Hague Evidence Convention" or "Conven-
tion") was adopted at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. The United States was one of the first coun-
tries to ratify the Convention, to which nineteen other countries are now
party.
The Hague Evidence Convention represents an attempt to bridge
differences between the systems used by common law countries for taking
evidence abroad and those used by civil law countries. As its name sug-
20 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
21 Done at The Hague, March 18, 1970; entered into force for the United States on October 7,
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gests, the Convention applies where evidence is to be obtained in one
signatory country for use in judicial proceedings of a "civil or commer-
cial" nature in another signatory country. 2 The term "civil or commer-
cial" is not defined in the Convention, but is interpreted by each country
according to its own law.
The Convention consists of forty-two articles divided into three
chapters. Chapter I deals with the taking of evidence via letters of re-
quest. Chapter II contains provisions for the taking of evidence by diplo-
matic or consular officials, and court-appointed commissioners. Chapter
III contains general provisions.
The basic method for the securing of evidence abroad contemplated
by the Convention is the letter of request, formerly called a letter or let-
ters rogatory. The letter comprises a request from a judicial authority in
one country (the "requesting authority") to a judicial authority in an-
other country (the "requested authority") for evidence (testimony or
documents) needed for a proceeding in the requesting country. The let-
ter of request is transmitted through a "Central Authority" in the receiv-
ing state. Each state party to the Convention is required to designate a
"Central Authority" for this purpose.2"
Chapter I specifies what information must be contained in the letter
of request2 4 ; language requirements; 25 procedures for execution of a letter
of request, including the use of "special procedures" such as oaths, ver-
batim transcripts, cross-examination26 ; compulsory measures27; the avail-
ability of testimonial privileges28; grounds for a refusal to execute a letter
of request 29 ; and permissible fees and costs.
3 0
As to the taking of evidence by diplomatic or consular officials,
Chapter II draws a distinction between the taking of evidence by such
officials from their own nationals, and the taking of evidence from na-
tionals of their host countries or of third countries. Generally, prior per-
mission from the host country is required in the latter but not the former
case, although a state may alter this by declaration.3s Most states have
made reservations relevant to these articles. Diplomatic and consular
officials have no power to compel testimony, but must apply to the courts
of the host state, which use their own standards and measures of compul-
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32 Article 17.
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is taken by such officials.33
Chapter II allows the taking of evidence by court-appointed com-
missioners, a familiar concept in U.S. civil procedure,34 but a concept
unknown in civil law jurisdictions prior to the Convention. Most civil
law countries have made reservations to this aspect of the Convention.
The Convention allows member states to permit the taking of evi-
dence by methods other than those contemplated by the Convention. It
also allows states to permit the taking of evidence by the methods con-
templated by the Convention, but under less restrictive terms.
35
The Convention permits states to make a reservation to the require-
ment of Article 4(2), that they accept letters of request in English or
French (i.e., not necessarily in their own language). A number of states
have made reservations to the language provisions, and these should be
checked carefully for each country. Other states have disallowed all or
part of Chapter II, and many have imposed conditions and requirements
that should be carefully reviewed.
Finally, Article 23 of the Convention allows states to declare at the
time of ratification or accession that they will "not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of docu-
ments as known in common-law countries.
' 36
In 1978, a special commission appointed to study the operation of
the Convention approved a model form of a letter of request to be used in
drafting requests under the Convention.37
Issues Arising under the Convention
The provision in Article 23 allowing declarations limiting pre-trial
discovery of documents received little attention at the time the Conven-
tion was ratified by the United States. In recent years, however, it has
been the focal point of virulent controversy between the United States
and other member states. Most member states have made declarations
either denying entirely, or severely limiting the discovery of documents.
Among the second group of countries, which includes the Scandinavian
countries, the declarations frequently include a specification of the kinds
of documentary request that will not be accepted (typically broad, non-
specific requests). This refusal to countenance "fishing expeditions" has
led U.S. litigants - typically, plaintiffs in product liability suits against
foreign defendants that have sold allegedly defective products on the U.S.
market - to seek discovery abroad from the foreign parties under the
more liberal procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In do-
ing so, litigants contend that the Convention, by virtue of Article 27, is
33 Article 19.
34 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 28(b).
35 Article 27.
36 Article 23.
37 The form is reprinted following the text of the Convention.
Vol. 17:247 1991
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not the exclusive and mandatory means of proceeding where a U.S. court
has jurisdiction over a foreign party.
After conflicting opinions in the lower courts, the United States
Supreme Court considered the relationship between the Convention and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court.38 The Court ruled, five to four, that
the Convention is not the exclusive and mandatory means of obtaining
foreign evidence. At the same time, the Court held that the Convention
cannot be disregarded whenever a U.S. court has jurisdiction over a for-
eign party from whom evidence is sought. In the majority's view, trial
courts should use their discretion, based on the facts of a particular case,
in determining the extent to which the use of Convention procedures
should be required.
The Aerospatiale decision effectively permits U.S. courts to avoid the
Convention, except where evidence is sought from third-party witnesses
who are not subject to their personal jurisdiction. Although the Supreme
Court's decision is viewed by some as a response to the intransigent atti-
tude of many Hague Evidence Convention countries towards discovery,
the decision could prove detrimental in the long term, depending on its
application by the lower courts. For example, it may well affect the will-
ingness of a foreign country to recognize and enforce any ensuing
judgment.








Federal Republic of Germany Sweden
Israel United Kingdom
Italy United States
III. THE FOREIGN SovEREIGN IMMUNITIES AcT OF 1976
Historical Background
For more than a century and a half, the United States generally
granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suits in U.S. courts.
In the The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,39 Chief Justice Marshall
concluded that, while the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory
38 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
39 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
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"is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself,"' the United States
had impliedly waived jurisdiction over certain activities of foreign sover-
eigns. Although the narrow holding of The Schooner Exchange was that
the courts lack jurisdiction over an armed ship of a foreign state found in
a U.S. port, that opinion came to be regarded as extending virtually abso-
lute immunity to foreign sovereigns.4'
As The Schooner Exchange made clear, however, foreign sovereign
immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United
States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the decisions of the polit-
ical branches, in particular, those of the Executive Branch, on whether to
exercise jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their
instrumentalities.42
Until 1952, the State Department uniformly certified immunity in
all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns. But in the 1952 "Tate Let-
ter", the State Department announced its adoption of the "restrictive"
theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Under this theory immunity is
confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign's public acts, (fure im-
peril), and does not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly
commercial or "private" acts, (fure gestionis).
The restrictive theory was not initially enacted into law, however,
and its application proved troublesome. As in the past, initial responsi-
bility for deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily upon
the Executive Branch acting through the State Department. Since the
courts abided by the "suggestions of immunity" filed by the Executive
Branch, foreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State
Department in seeking immunity. On occasion, political considerations
led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immmunity would not
have been available under the restrictive theory.
An additional complication was that foreign nations did not always
make requests to the State Department. In such cases, the responsibility
fell to the courts to determine whether sovereign immunity existed. This
was generally done by reference to prior State Department decisions.
Thus, sovereign immunity determinations were made in two different
branches, subject to a variety of factors, occasionally including political
considerations. Not surprisingly, the governing standards were neither
clear nor uniformly applied. 3
In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA") in order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplo-
matic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to "assur[e] liti-
40 Id. at 136.
41 See, eg., Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
42 See, e.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
43 See, Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1, 11-13, 15-17 (1976).
Vol. 17:247 1991
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gants that... decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process." 44 To accomplish these objectives,
the FSIA contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing
claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state and its
political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities.
Synopsis of the Act
The FSIA codifies, as a matter of federal law, the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity. Therefore, a foreign state is normally immune
from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts,45 subject to a set of ex-
ceptions specified in §§ 1605 and 1607. Those exceptions include actions
in which the foreign state has explicitly or impliedly waived its immu-
nity, actions based upon commercial activities of the foreign sovereign
carried on in the United States or causing a direct effect in the United
States, and actions for damages for tortious injury caused in the United
States. When one of the specified exceptions applies, "the foreign state
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.""
The FSIA expressly provides that its standards control in "the
courts of the United States and of the States,"'47 and thus clearly contem-
plates that such suits may be brought in either federal or state courts.
However, "i[n] view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign
states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this
area,"'48 the FSIA guarantees foreign states the right to remove any civil
action from a state court to a federal court.49 If one of the specified
exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal or state court may
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a). If the claim does
not fall within one of the exceptions, U.S. courts are incompetent to hear
the case.
The Supreme Court has firmly established that the FSIA is the sole
and exclusive jurisdictional basis for suits against foreign states and their
agencies and instrumentalities, including foreign state owned corpora-
tions or other legal entities.50
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN STATE JUDGMENTS
The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act
51
" H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1991).
46 § 1606.
47 § 1604.
48 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976).
49 § 1441(d).
50 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); erlinden B. V v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
51 The aim of the adoption of the Act by several states, (e.g., New York), was not so much to
aid recognition of foreign judgments, but to enhance the prospect of recognition of domestic judg-
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("Act"), which has now been adopted by twenty states, is generally re-
garded as a codification of preexisting common law principles as to when
U.S. courts will recognize and enforce money judgments rendered
abroad. The Act will be used in this paper as a convenient outline for a
synopsis of the principles governing recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments.
"Foreign State" and "Judgment" Defined
Subdivision (1) of § 1 defines a "foreign state" as any governmental
unit other than those listed. The jurisdictions listed are American juris-
dictions. Their courts' judgments get full faith and credit and can be
summarily registered in most states of the American Union. Thus, state
court judgments do not need assistance from the Act.
Subdivision (2) clarifies subdivision (1) in that the section applies
only to money judgments and excludes from recognition judgments for
taxes, fines, or penalties, as well as support judgments in matrimonial
and family matters.
Finality
Only foreign judgments that are "final, conclusive and enforceable"
are subject to enforcement. This excludes all intermediate and interlocu-
tory determinations, including money judgments, if, under the law of the
rendering jurisdiction, there is any impediment to their immediate en-
forcement. The only stated exception is when an appeal is pending or
when the judgment is subject to appeal. An appeal as such does not
prevent the judgment from being deemed final.
There may well be good reason for seeking to at least start an action
in the United States on the foreign judgment even though an appeal is
pending in the foreign jurisdiction. If the judgment debtor has assets in
the United States, the commencement of an enforcement action may sup-
port an application for an order of attachment to preserve assets until the
action is determined.
52
Recognition and Procedure for Enforcement
Unless one of the grounds listed in § 4 of the Act for refusing recog-
nition is applicable, § 3 requires that our courts treat the foreign judg-
ment as conclusive. Ordinarily, it will be a judgment creditor who will
seek to invoke the provisions of the Act to enforce the judgment, but the
section applies as well to a judgment which "denies" recovery of money.
Thus, a defendant in a foreign action who prevailed against the plaintiff's
ments by foreign courts. In states which do not recognize and enforce U.S. judgments unless it is
shown that the U.S. reciprocates, the Act makes the requisite showing of reciprocity. A statutory
manifestation is more convincing than case law to the courts of some of these nations, especially
those under the civil law system.
52 See also § 6.
Vol. 17.247 1991
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money claim is just as entitled to have the judgment deemed binding in
his favor as the plaintiff is when he prevails. The second sentence of § 3
allows the judgment to be interposed as an "affirmative defense."
A judgment creditor with a foreign money judgment may convert it
into a domestic judgment either by bringing an ordinary action on the
judgment or, in some states, by proceeding under statutes which permit
the judgment creditor to accompany a summons with a set of motion
papers and move for summary judgment.53
Once converted into a domestic judgment, the foreign judgment be-
comes enforceable like a domestic judgment.
Grounds for Refusing Recognition
Section 4 permits refusal to recognize a foreign judgment on a vari-
ety of grounds. Subdivision (a) of § 4 states three mandatory grounds
which precluded U.S. courts from recognizing the foreign judgment.
Each cited ground, i.e., the want of an impartial tribunal and fair proce-
dures, the lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, are long-established grounds for refusing rec-
ognition under preexisting law. The want of personal jurisdiction would,
in the United States, mean that our domestic concept of due process was
not satisfied in the foreign forum, thus precluding recognition of the
judgment on constitutional grounds.
In determining whether the foreign court had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, the domestic law of the state where enforcement is
sought must be consulted. If the foreign court's personal jurisdiction ac-
cords with domestic laws, recognition may not be refused for lack of
personal jurisdiction, although recognition may be refused on one of the
six discretionary grounds set forth in subdivision (b) of § 4.
Lack of notice and opportunity to defend in the foreign forum is a
ground for refusing recognition under paragraph (1). This goes to the
roots of due process in the United States, and therefore, makes a refusal
to recognize the judgment constitutionally mandatory rather than, as
subdivision (b) of § 4 would have it, discretionary.
The "public policy" objection of paragraph (3) is a traditional
ground for protection in international agreements which are analogous to
the Act. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which the United
States has ratified, includes in Article V, § 2(b), as a reason for refusing
to enforce an arbitral award, that it would be "contrary to the public
policy" of the country where enforcement is sought.
A refusal to recognize a foreign judgment because it conflicts "with
another final and conclusive judgment," the ground stated in paragraph
53 A judgment of a foreign country may not be enforced by registration, which is available only
for the judgments of courts of the United States. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
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(4), should occur only when some reason is shown why the latter judg-
ment should have priority.
The ground in paragraph (5) involves what is known as an "ouster"
agreement, whereby the parties stipulate that disputes shall be settled
only in particular courts, thereby "ousting" all other jurisdictions. If an-
other forum has assumed jurisdiction despite the ouster, its judgment can
be refused recognition under paragraph (5).
Paragraph (5) also covers the situation in which the foreign court
assumed jurisdiction, over the objection of a party, concerning a dispute
which both sides had agreed to submit to arbitration or to a similar extra-
judicial dispute settlement machinery. Thus, if it appears that the judg-
ment creditor deliberately sought out a court in a jurisdiction hostile to
arbitration, even though he agreed to arbitrate, he can be denied the
fruits of the judgment.
Paragraph (6) permits a refusal of recognition if the foreign court
can be shown to have been a "seriously inconvenient" forum. This
ground applies only if the court's jurisdiction rested solely on local ser-
vice of process on the judgment debtor, i.e., where there was no other
jurisdictional nexus.
Bases for Personal Jurisdiction
As noted earlier, subdivision (a)(2) of § 4 provides that a foreign
judgment may not be enforced if the rendering court lacked personal ju-
risdiction over the judgment debtor. Subdivision (a) of § 5 then sets
forth a list of bases deemed adequate for the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion, thus removing the barrier of § 4(a)(2) if one of the listed bases is
present.
To begin with, mere personal service within the foreign country as-
sures jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of § 5. U.S.
courts would be hypocritical to hold otherwise, since American law still
recognizes local service even upon a transient as a basis for personal ju-
risdiction.5 4 Recognition may, however, be refused when service was the
sole jurisdictional basis if it is also shown that the foreign forum was a
"seriously inconvenient" one.55
Under paragraph (2), voluntary appearance in the foreign proceed-
ings submits the defendant to the court's jurisdiction. There are, how-
ever, two exceptions. The first exception is when the appearance was
solely to protect property seized in the foreign place. This exception ac-
knowledges that the need to protect property may sometimes compel a
submission to jurisdiction when foreign law allows such coercive use of
the property's coincidental presence. An appearance under such circum-
stances would be an especially sympathetic point for the judgment debtor
if the property was unrelated to the underlying dispute.
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The second exception in paragraph (2) is when the appearance was
solely for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction, what used to be termed
a "special appearance." If the judgment debtor did more than preserve
his jurisdictional objection in the foreign court, he will be deemed to have
submitted voluntarily to its jurisdiction and to have forfeited the right to
claim an exception for himself under paragraph (2).
The remaining grounds listed in subdivision (a) of § 5 are analogous
to those which are now generally recognized for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. Paragraph (3) recognizes a contractual submission. Paragraph (4)
recognizes domicile on the part of an individual defendant and place of
incorporation, or the "doing business" test in the case of a corporate
defendant. Paragraph (5) acknowledges a type of "long arm" jurisdic-
tion analogous, if not identical, to the "transaction of business" test.
Paragraph (6) involves a combination of a general long arm statute and
the more specialized alternatives of a traditional nonresident motorist
statute.
The bases listed in subdivision (a) of § 5 are by no means exclusive.
A state is free, under subdivision (b), to recognize in respect of the for-
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